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Abstract: The patent system plays a vital role in encouraging
innovation, by providing a measure of protection for investments
made to commercialize new products and processes. Changes in
patent law and practice in the last two decades have made the system
less effective, by making it too easy to get patents on trivial and non-
original ideas, while also making it easier to wield patents as legal
weapons against competitors. Reform of the patent system should be
based on an analysis of the effects of patent practice and policy on the
incentives to apply for dubious patents, to share information with the
patent office about technologies under consideration, and to litigate
patent disputes. Key elements of reform include review processes that
afford the opportunity and incentive for outside parties to bring to the
patent office information that they have that bears on the novelty of
patent applications, and changes to litigation rules to diminish the
risk of large uncertain costs from infringement suits.
* Fred C. Hecht Professor in Economics, Dean of Arts and Sciences, Brandeis University.
This essay is adapted from my testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Property at an oversight hearing on patent reform held on February 15, 2007. American
Innovation at Risk: The Case for Patent Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, noth
Cong. 7-15 (2007) (statement of Adam Jaffe, Fred C. Hecht Professor in Economics,
Brandeis University), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?
dbname=no_house hearings&docid=f:33315.pdf. That testimony was in turn based on
my 2004 book with Josh Lerner, ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM Is ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND
PROGRESS, AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT (2004). The specific opinions contained herein are
my own and not necessarily shared by Professor Lerner.
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I. INTRODUCTION
United States Patent 6,293,874 (2001):
Amusement Apparatus for Kicking the User's Buttocks
User-operated
Abstract: An amusement apparatus including a user-operated
and controlled apparatus for self-infliction of repetitive
blows to the user's buttocks by a plurality of elongated arms
bearing flexible extensions that rotate under the user's
control.... As the user rotates the crank, the user's buttocks
are paddled by flexible shoes located on each outboard end
of the elongated arms to provide amusement to the user and
viewers of the paddling .... 1
Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the United
States evolved from a colonial backwater to become the preeminent
economic and technological power of the world. The foundation of
this evolution was the systematic exploitation and application of
technology to economic problems: initially agriculture, transportation,
communication, and the manufacture of goods, and then later health
care, information technology, and virtually every aspect of modern
life.
1 U.S. Patent No. 6,293,874 (filed Jan. 4, 2000) (issued Sept. 25, 2001). Professor Paroma
Sanyal first brought to my attention the patent reproduced in part above.
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From the beginning of the republic, the patent system has played a
key role in this evolution. Derived from the Constitution itself, and
codified in roughly its modern form in 1836, the patent system was an
essential aspect of the legal framework in which inventions from
Edison's light bulb and the Wright brothers' airplane to the cell phone
and Prozac were developed.
Popular discourse regarding the patent system emphasizes its role
in creating an economic incentive for the creative act of invention.
From an economic perspective, this incentive for invention is not
paramount because creativity seems to be inherent in human nature,
making a flow of new creative ideas likely under any incentive system.
But a creative idea does not help society unless it is taken further and
converted to a commercially useful new product or process and this
stage is costly and uncertain. The economic function of the patent
system is to provide a measure of predictability and protection to this
expensive and risky process of product and process development. As
such, the patent system lies at the very heart of technological process,
which is in turn the primary engine of economic growth.
In the last two decades, however, the role of patents in the U.S.
innovation system has changed from fuel for the engine to sand in the
gears. Two apparently mundane changes in patent law and policy
have subtly, but inexorably, transformed the patent system from a
shield that innovators could use to protect themselves, to a grenade
that firms lob indiscriminately at their competitors, thereby increasing
the cost and risk of innovation rather than decreasing it. As a result,
inventors, research and development managers and entrepreneurs
involved with the patent system have come to feel like users of the
patented device illustrated above, punished by the system in ways that
would be amusing were the consequences not so serious.
Examples of dysfunctional patent behavior have become staples of
the business and popular press:
Patents on inventions that are trivially obvious, such
as the "Method for Swinging on a Swing"2
("invented" by a five-year-old), and "User Operated
Amusement Apparatus for Kicking the User's
Buttocks"3 ("invented" by a supposed grown-up);
2 U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000).
3 U.S. Patent No. 6,293,874, supra note 1.
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* Patents in areas where patents have historically been
uncommon, but covering purported discoveries
familiar to practitioners and academics alike, such as
Amazon.com's attempt to prevent
barnesandnoble.com from allowing customers to
buy books with a single mouse-click, 4 and a bright
MBA student's patents on an option-pricing formula
published in the academic finance literature two
decades earlier5 ;
" Patents that have become weapons for firms to
harass competitors, such as the decade-long effort by
Rambus, a semiconductor designer, to control
computer memory technology by ensuring that a
long string of patents, all derived from a single 199o
patent application, incorporated important features
of an industry-wide standard developed through a
voluntary industry standard-setting association 6;
In the last several years, a variety of groups concerned with different
aspects of public policy related to innovation have undertaken studies
and issued reports calling for major reform of the patent system.
These include the Federal Trade Commission's 2003 report ("FrC
report" )7 , and the Board on Science, Technology and Economic Policy
of the National Research Council's 2005 report ("STEP report").'
After the issuance of the FTC report and the STEP report, the
American Intellectual Property Law Association ("AIPLA") joined with
4 Amazon.corn, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
5 ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN
PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT
145-48(2004).
6 Id. at 68-74.
7 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION
AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/io/innovationrpt.pdf.
8 BD. ON Sci., TECH., AND ECON. POL'Y, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark
B. Myers eds., 2004) [hereinafter STEP REPORT], available at www.nap.edu/html/
patentsystem. See also BD. ON SCI., TECH., AND ECON. POL'Y, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds.,
2003), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/io77o.html.
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the FTC and STEP Board to sponsor a series of "Town Meetings"
across the country in 2005, and the AIPLA endorsed many of the FTC
and the STEP Board's reform recommendations.
II. PATENT POLICY DEVELOPMENTS OVER THE LAST Two DECADES
The origin of today's problems relates back to 1982 when Congress
amended the process for judicial appeal of patent cases in the federal
courts so that all appeals are now all heard by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFC"), rather than the twelve
regional courts of appeals, as had previously been the case. And in the
early 199os, Congress changed the structure of fees and financing of
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") itself, attempting to
turn it into a kind of service agency whose costs of operation are
covered by fees paid by its clients (the patent applicants). Through a
complex interplay of politics and organizational dynamics, this change
seems to have been the origin of a change in the PTO's orientation,
from an agency focused on protecting the public from the issuance of
inappropriate patents, to an agency focused on keeping patent
applicants happy by processing their applications speedily.
It is now apparent that these seemingly mundane procedural
changes, taken together, have resulted in the most profound changes
in U.S. patent policy and practice since 1836. The CAFC has
interpreted patent law to make it easer to get patents, easier to enforce
patents against others, easier to get large financial awards from such
enforcement, and harder for those accused of infringing patents to
challenge the patents' validity. At roughly the same time, the new
orientation of the Patent Office has combined with the court's legal
interpretations to make it much easier to get patents. However
complex the origins and motivations of these two Congressional
actions, it is clear that no one sat down and decided that what the U.S.
economy needed was to transform patents into much more potent
legal weapons, while simultaneously making them much easier to get.
An unforeseen outcome has been an alarming growth in legal
wrangling over patents. More worrisome still, the risk of being sued,
and demands by patent holders for royalty payments to avoid being
sued, are seen increasingly as major costs of bringing new products
and processes to market. Thus, the patent system-intended to foster
and protect innovation-is generating waste and uncertainty that both
hinder and threaten the innovative process.
The growth in the sheer magnitude of the patent phenomenon has
been breathtaking. The weakening of examination standards and the
increase in patent applications has led to a dramatic increase in the
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number of patents granted in the U.S. The number of patents granted
in the U.S., which increased at less than 1% per year from 1930 until
1982 (the year the CAFC was created), roughly tripled between 1983
and 2001 (from sixty-two thousand per year to over 18o thousand per
year, an annual rate of increase of about 6%).9 After dipping slightly
in 2004 and 2005, the number granted in 206 set a new record of
over 196 thousand.1° Applications, too, have ballooned, from less than
120 thousand in 1982, to 453 thousand in 2006, with no sign of
slowing down.1"
While some of this increase appears to reflect real growth in
innovation, it is clear that a large part of the increase is a response to
the increased laxity of the PTO, which grants a significantly larger
fraction of the applications it receives than do its counterparts in
Europe and Japan. More worrisome still is a dramatic and inexorable
increase since the early 199os in the rate of litigation around patents.
The number of patent cases filed has doubled in a decade and
continues to rise. And the cost of defending a patent suit has risen as
well; a patent infringement allegation from a competitor can now
mean legal fees in the millions. For an under-capitalized startup, this
prospect creates an overwhelming pressure to settle even frivolous
complaints. Consumers therefore have less access to new products-
from lifesaving drugs to productivity-enhancing software-than would
be the case if innovative companies were not distracted from
innovation by litigation and fear of litigation.
Much public attention has focused on the expansion of patenting
into areas where it was previously unimportant or non-existent, such
as biotechnology, software and business methods. Indeed, some of
the worst abuses are in these areas. But concern about specific
technologies potentially masks the deeper, fundamental problem. The
incentives in the system now encourage frivolous applications, cursory
review of those applications by the PTO, and indiscriminate filing of
patent infringement suits as a generic competitive weapon. To get the
system back on track, the system must be changed so that its
incentives discourage frivolous applications, encourage rigorous
9 U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART: CALENDAR YEARS
1963-2o6, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/usstat.htm. For a more
extensive discussion of these data and historical trends, see JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 5,
at 11-13.
10 U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 9.
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patent examination, and discourage patent litigation where there is
not a true invention to protect.
IIl. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
While different analysts of the patent landscape have emphasized
different aspects of the patent policy problems, there is general
agreement on broad goals for system reform:
Improve patent quality.12 As illustrated by examples
discussed above, people are getting patents for
inventions that are not new and/or are obvious. One
way to solve this, of course, would be to make it
much harder to get a patent on anything. If this
occurred, the few patents that were issued would be
of very high quality, in the sense of being deserved
by the applicant. But the objective of patent quality
has to be more than just making sure bad patents
don't issue. It has to include also making sure that
inventors do get patents when they have a truly
novel, non-obvious invention, that such patents are
processed relatively quickly and reliably, and that
once granted they provide an adequate property
right to protect subsequent investment in the
invention.
" Reduce uncertainty. A primary objective of reform
should be to reduce the uncertainty that now
pervades many aspects of the patent system.
(Ironically, the only aspect of the patent process that
has become more certain is the application process
itself, because the ultimate granting of some patent
from each original application has become almost a
sure thing!) The sand in the gears of the innovation
machine is that companies and individuals must
constantly fear that their research and product
development may come to naught, because someone
is going to assert an as-yet unknown or untested
patent against them. Further, when such an
12See STEP REPORT, supra note 8, at 87-95.
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assertion of patent infringement is made, the
uncertainty about the ability to defend against that
assertion often leads either to abandonment of the
allegedly infringing technology, or to an agreement
to pay possibly unnecessary royalties. Of course,
minimizing uncertainty is also important for the
holders of valid patents. Reforms designed to
increase patent quality must be designed in such a
way that novel, non-obvious inventions receive
patent protection that their owners can rely upon.
Keep costs under control. In fiscal year 2006, the
Patent Office spent roughly $1.7 billion for its
operations. In recent years, Congress has increased
PTO fees and budgetary appropriations, thereby
responding to one aspect of the recommendations of
groups such as the FTC, the STEP Board and the
AIPLA. It is important to remember that
appropriations to the PTO represent only a small
fraction of what society spends on the patent system.
Patent applicants spend several times that amount,
and patent litigants billions more. These resources
might be well spent if they achieved a reasonably
smooth functioning system. But the system is not
working well and it is reasonable to wonder whether
we need to invest more of society's resources in the
patent process. We need to look for solutions that go
beyond throwing money at the problem.
IV. SOME SIMPLE TRUTHS
The next step towards reform is to understand some basic realities
about the innovation process.
A. MISTAKES WILL ALWAYS BE WITH US
Patent examination is never going to be perfect. Examiners are
human. More important, there is an essentially irreducible aspect of
judgment in determining if an invention is truly new. After all, even
young Albert Einstein faced challenges while assessing applications as
a "Technical Expert-Third Class" in the Swiss Patent Office.13
13 RONALD W. CLARK, EINSTEIN: THE LIFE AND TIMES 46-50 (1971).
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Therefore, we cannot hope to have a system in which no "bad" patents
ever issue. But we can hope to have a system with fewer bad patents.
Since there will always be mistakes, it is important to have a system
that functions reasonably well despite the issuance of some bad
patents.
At current application rates, it would be very expensive to give all
patent applications an examination sufficiently thorough to reduce
significantly the problems with bad patents being issued. The patent
system is important, however, so it is possible that spending several
billion additional dollars on the PTO would be worthwhile for society.
But this kind of dramatic increase in PTO resources does not seem
very realistic in the current fiscal environment. Fortunately, it is also
not necessary to expend the resources necessary to provide very
reliable examination for all patent applications.
B. MUCH MORE CHAFF THAN WHEAT
The first step to understanding why greatly increasing the
resources for examination is not the best solution to the problem is to
understand that most patents are, and always will be, worthless and
unimportant. This is not a feature of the Patent Office; it is a feature
of the innovation process. It is partly due to the human tendency for
each of us to think that our ideas are better than other people think
they are. But it also reflects a deeper attribute of the process of
technological development: the significance of a new idea usually
cannot be known when it is first developed, because that significance
depends on subsequent developments, both technological and
economic. Many, many, "good" ideas are patented but never actually
turn out to be worth anything. It is not that they should not have been
patented to begin with. It is just that for every invention with lasting
technological or economic significance, there will always be dozens or
hundreds of ideas that seemed potentially worthwhile, but that
eventually proved to be valueless.
The fact that almost all patents are ultimately worthless has an
important implication for the "patent quality" problem. If most
patents are doomed to be consigned to the dustbin of technological
history, it cannot make sense to spend a lot of resources to make sure
that they all receive very high quality examinations before issuing.
The legions of inventors and patent attorneys may not like to think
about this, but for the vast majority of patent applications, it will
simply never matter-either to the inventor, her employer, or
competitors-whether the patent is allowed to issue or not.
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C. "RATIONAL IGNORANCE"
If careful examination is expensive, and the vast majority of
patents will never matter to anyone, then it would be inefficient to
expend society's resources on careful examination of all patent
applications. In the colorful phrase of Mark Lemley, we can think of
the poor quality of patent examination as representing "Rational
Ignorance," by which he means that society is rationally choosing to
remain ignorant about which patents really should be granted by the
PTO.14 Lemley argues that it is, in fact, reasonably efficient to simply
accept that PTO examination will be of poor quality, and that the cases
that really matter will have to be sorted out in the courts.15 Court
cases are expensive, but because only the small fraction of patents that
matter will ever get litigated, Lemley argues that the cost of litigation
is, overall, efficient.16
I agree with Lemley that it would be inefficient to provide
thorough examination for all applications at the current rate of patent
application. I disagree, however, that the current situation is
acceptably efficient. First, while the out-of-pocket cost of litigation
may be tolerable, the intangible cost of a system with pervasive low-
quality patents is much higher than just the cost of paying lawyers to
file and defend patent cases. The uncertainty that the current system
creates for all parties regarding who can legally use what technologies
is a cost that is difficult to quantify, but is surely significant. Talk to
anyone involved in trying to commercialize new technologies, and you
are likely to hear complaints about the headaches and uncertainty
created by overlapping patent claims. Further, this uncertainty
undermines everyone's incentives to invest in new technology. From
the perspective of society as a whole, the loss of new products and
processes that never make it to market, or that gain a toehold and are
then abandoned after a threatened patent fight, is much larger than
the visible costs of patent litigation. And, fortunately, there are
changes that could be made in the system that would improve patent
quality without requiring dramatic increases in the resources used in
the examination process.
14 Mark Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495,1497
(2001).
15 Id. at 1531-32.
16 Id.
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D. INVENTORS RESPOND TO How THE PATENT OFFICE BEHAVES
The key to more efficient patent examination is to go beyond
thinking about what patent examiners do, and consider how the
nature of the examination process affects the behavior of inventors
and firms. To put it crudely, if the Patent Office allows bad patents to
issue, this encourages people with bad applications to apply. While
the increase in the rate of patent applications over the last two
decades is driven by many factors, one important factor is the simple
fact that it has gotten so much easier to get a patent, so applications
that never would have been previously submitted now look like they
are worth a try. Conversely, if the PTO consistently rejected
applications for bad patents, people would understand that bad
applications are a waste of time and money. While some people would
still try-either because they are not smart enough to know they have
a bad application, or because they are willing to take a roll of the
dice-the number of applications would likely be considerably fewer
that it has been in recent years.
E. GET INFORMATION TO FLOW INTO THE PTO
Another important aspect of incentives has to do with
information: who has it and what do they do with it? Much of the
information needed to decide if a given patent application should
issue-particularly information about what related technologies
already exist-is in the hands of private parties, rather than in the
hands of the PTO. And in many cases there are strong incentives for
firms to share this information. If a competitor of mine has filed a
patent application, the last thing I want to see is for them to be issued
a patent on an application that would have been rejected if the PTO
had known about my technology. I would thus have a strong incentive
to provide this information, if only the PTO would give me an
opportunity for input, and if taking advantage of such an opportunity
does not create strategic disadvantages for me down the road.
Further, if the PTO routinely invited such input, various kinds of
brokers and consultants would likely emerge who would specialize in
helping firms stay abreast of developments at the PTO. Creating
opportunities of this sort is another way that the system could exploit
the incentives of private parties in order to increase efficiency.
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F. POTENTIAL LITIGANTS RESPOND TO How THE COURTS BEHAVE
When the CAFC issues rulings that increase the chance of the
patentee prevailing in an infringement suit, the consequences of this
change are not limited to possible changes in the outcome of specific
cases. Such a change in perceived success probabilities changes what
disputes are, in fact, litigated. Conversations with attorneys involved
in patent disputes make clear that the CAFC's strengthening of the
offensive and defensive weapons of the patentee has significantly
increased patentees' willingness to bring suit. Similarly, the change
has significantly decreased the willingness of accused infringers to
fight, even when they believe that the patents being used to threaten
them are not valid. In particular, firms with highly successful
products-when faced with a jury trial over complex issues of novelty
and obviousness, and the risk that defeat might mean large penalties
for willful infringement and/or an injunction shutting down their
product-may feel that they have no rational business choice but to
pay a ransom to avoid litigation. When this happens, the cost of
innovation rises and society is the loser. Constraining the growth in
litigation, and the uncertainty created for all innovators by the risk of
suit, will require a change in these incentives.
V. BUILDING BLOCKS OF REFORM
There are three key conceptual pieces for thinking about patent
policy reform:
* Investigate ways to create incentives and
opportunities for parties that have information
about the novelty and obviousness of inventions to
bring that information to the PTO when it is
considering a patent grant.
" Consider the possibility for multiple levels of review
of patent applications, with the time and effort
expended escalating as an application proceeds to
higher levels, so that money is not wasted on
unimportant patents, but sufficient care is taken to
avoid mistakes where the stakes are high.
* Address the balance of incentives and opportunities
for patent holders and alleged infringers in the
context of litigation. People with valid patents that
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are being infringed must have opportunity to seek
redress, but the current system makes it too easy for
patent holders to use threatened litigation-even
when based on patents of dubious validity-too risky
for alleged infringers to fight.
The first two concepts are aimed at making the PTO more effective
at reasonable cost. The third addresses the reality that the best of all
possible PTOs will still make mistakes, and so we need a court system
that is capable of rectifying those mistakes.
Effective reform must start with the recognition that much of the
information needed to decide if a given application should be
approved is in the hands of competitors of the applicant, rather than
the PTO. A review process with multiple potential review levels
efficiently balances the need to bring in outside information with the
reality that most patents are unimportant. Multilevel review, with the
barriers to invoking review and the thoroughness of that review both
increasing at higher levels, would naturally focus attention on the
most potentially important applications. Most patents would never
receive anything other than the most basic examinations. But for
those applications that really mattered, parties would have an
incentive and opportunities to bring information in their possession
before the PTO, and the PTO would have more resources to help it
make the right decision. Although there is disagreement about the
details, implementation of a review procedure or procedures of this
kind, has been endorsed by the FTC, the STEP Board and the AIPLA.
Legislation creating a new post-grant review procedure is
currently under discussion in Congress. An issue of heated debate is
the length of time after initial grant during which such a review could
be invoked. Some patent reform advocates are pushing for the right of
review to extend for the life of the patent. Such an approach would
seriously undermine the fundamental purpose of the patent system to
foster investment in development of patented products by reducing
uncertainty. Balancing the need for review to ensure patent quality
with the need of patent holders to be able to rely on their patent
protection calls for a review process that is available only for a
relatively short period of time.
If bad patents with important consequences were weeded out by
the PTO, the incentive to file frivolous applications in the first place
would be reduced. This would break the current vicious cycle in which
inventors are induced to make marginal applications by their
likelihood of success, and the resulting flood of applications
overwhelms the patent office and makes it harder to separate the
wheat from the chaff.
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Breaking the vicious cycle of bad examination and bad
applications is the key to reform of the patent review process. But
there are always going to be mistakes, and so it is important that the
court system operate efficiently to rectify those mistakes, while
protecting holders of valid patents. Today, the legal playing field is
significantly tilted in favor of patentees.
Professor Lerner and I have highlighted the role of juries in
deciding patent validity questions as a crucial source of undesirable
and unnecessary uncertainly in the litigation process. The evidence in
a patent case can be highly technical, and the average juror has little
competence to evaluate it. Having decisions made by people who
cannot really understand the evidence increases the uncertainty
surrounding the outcome. The combination of this uncertainty with
the legal presumption of validity-the rule that patents must be
presumed legitimate unless proven otherwise-is a big reason why
accused infringers often settle rather than fight even when they think
they are right.
For accused infringers, the difficulties associated with the
presumption of validity and the uncertainty of juries are compounded
by the availability of remedies or penalties for infringement that are
far out of proportion to the economic harm that a patent holder may
have suffered as the result of infringement. While it is important that
patent holders have the ability to uphold valid patents, remedies that
are vastly disproportionate to the economic significance of the patent
at issue do not serve any legitimate public policy purpose, and create
the incentive and opportunity for those who would use the patent
system for ransom and extortion rather than innovation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The protection for true innovators created by a workable patent
system is vital to technological change and economic growth. The
problems in the existing U.S. patent system are structural, and the
solutions need to be fundamental. As much as the PTO and the courts
can, and should, address some of the weaknesses of the existing
system, meaningful reform requires important modifications to the
statutory framework. In these days of polarization and ideological
divide in Washington, patent policy reform offers an unusual
opportunity for real action in the public interest. As evidenced by the
discussion in the FTC and STEP reports, being pro-reform does not
make one anti-patent. On the contrary, the motivation for patent
reform derives precisely from the recognition that a well-functioning
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patent system is absolutely crucial to our technological progress and
economic health.

